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On the Causes of, and Circumstances attending the Explosion 
which occurred at InghaID Colliery, Thornhill, Yorkshire, 
on the 9th September, 1947 
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HUGH GAITSKELL. C.B.E., M.P., 
l\1inister of Fuel and Power. 10 J\1ay, 1948. 
SIR, 
I.-INTRODUCTORY 
1.  In compliance with your direction, I have held a Formal Investigation 
wlder the provisions of Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 191 I, and under the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power Act, 1945, into the causes of, and circumstance::. 
attending, the explosion at lngham Colliery, Thomhill, Yorkshire, on the 
9th September, 19-17, cau:sing the loss of 12 lives and injuries to one person. 
I have now the honour to submit my report. 
2. By kind permission of the Mayor and Corporation of Dewsbury, the Inquiry 
was held in the Council Chamber of the Town Hall, Dewsbury, from the 11 th to 
the 14th November, inclush'c, and I desire to record my appreciation of their 
assistance in placing such suitable accommodation at my disposal. 
3. The appearances at the Inquiry were as follows :-
(a) Ministry of Fuel and Power 
Mr. H. J. Humphrys, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines. 
Mr. E. S. Rees, H.l\1. District Inspector of Mines. 
Mr. G. M. Har\,ey, H.M. ElectIical Inspector of Mine�. 
Dr. H. F. Coward, Director of Safety in Mines Research and Testing 
Branch. 
(b) Natiollal Coal Board 
Mr. J. Hunter, Production Director, North Eastern Division. 
Mr. C. H. M. Glover, Legal Adviser, North Eastern Division. 
Mr. H. M. Hudspeth, Deputy Production Director, North Eastern 
Division. 
(c) Natiollal Union of Mineworkers 
Mr. J. A. Hall, President, Yorkshire Area. 
Mr. J. H. ScargiU, Secretary, Thornhill Branch. 
(d) British Association of Colliery Management 
Mr. A. S. Furniss, Solicitor. 
(e) National Association of Colliery Mallagers 
Mr. A. Holdsworth, President, Yorkshire Branch. 
(f) Yorkshire Deputies Associatioll 
Mr. ]. Howard. 
4. A list of the 2S witnesses examined during the course of the Inquiry is 
given in Appendix I, and a li<:;t of the persons killed and injured in the explosion 
is given in Appendix n, 
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Il.-GEKERAL lKFORMATIOK 
5. Inghdlll Colliery IS situated within the boundarie� and on the !>outh �idc 
of the Counly Borough of Dcw�bury in West Yorhhire, and has been producing 
coal since about 1860. It b connected underground to Combs Colliery and 
there is also a :,urfacc connection by a tramway along which the coal produced 
at Combs is hauled to the screening plant at Ingham. Part of the underground 
ventilation !:>y�tcll1 is common to both mines. Despite their 5urface and under­
ground connectIOn::. and the partly common system of ventilation, Ingham and 
Combs arc worked as !->cparate mines, being divided by properly delineated 
boundaries, under Section 25 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. 
6. rH l ngham Colliery there are two coal winding ::;hafb, the No. I downcast, 
13 feet in diameter, and the No. :! upeas.t, 14 feet in diameter. Both :-hafb 
were �unk to the Black Bed Seam at a depth of 277 yards, and each has an in�et 
at 188 yards 111 the Bee�ton Seam. An output of ISO tOIlS from the Black Bed 
and Blocking Bed Seam� was wound daily from the Black Bed level in No. 1 
shaft, and an output of -450 lons from the Bee-stol1 and \Vheatley Lime Seams 
wa" wound daily from the Beeston Seam inset in the 1\'0. 2 shaft, giving a total 
daily output for the coUiery of 630 tons, 80 per cent. of which went to the coke 
ovens. The \\,heatlc) Lime Seam has been worked for the past SS year::. so that 
its characteristics Here well known. It yields a coal for coking and industrial 
use. 
7. At Combs Collk'ry the downcast shaft is 11 feet in diameter and is sunk to 
the Black Bed Seam :It a depth of a69 yards. The daily output from this shaft 
is about 140 tons per day. From an inset in this shaft in the Reeston Seam at a 
depth of 224 yards, a road dri\'en in the seam forms the intake for the No. 2 
South District, \\rheatley Lime Seam, Ingham Colliery-the district in which 
the explosion occurred. There is abo a pumping shaft at Combs, ]2 feet 6 inches 
ill diameter, sunk to the New Hard:; Seam, at a depth of 106 yards, from which 
there is a connection to a staple pit sunk to the Blocking Bed Seam. These 
water Pit:. arc not used In connection with the working of the mine, apart from 
drainage purposes. 
8. The \'entilation was produced by a steam�dri\'en \Valker fan, 7 feet in 
diameter, situated on the surface at the Ingham upcast .:;haft, and passing 
140,000 cubic feet of air per minute at a water gauge of 3.6 inches. Safety 
lamps wer..:: u�cd throughout. The types of lamp provided for general under­
ground use wcre Ccag ��volt electric cap lamps and Ceag 4�volt electric hand 
hmps. For gas te5ting, the workmen were i:;sued with Davis�Kirkby Ramc 
5afety lamps, magnetically locked, and the officials used the Prestwich type 
Ko. 6 flame "afety lamp ... , fitted with internal relighters and lead rivet locks. 
To meet the requirements of the General Regulations in respect of precaution::; 
against coal dust, and to facilitate systematic cleaning�up, ::.tone-dusting and 
... ampling, the roadways were apportioned in numbered zone:;. Gypsum du�t 
was used for btone dusting throughout the colliery. The amount used was a 
little ovcr 2! lb. per ton of coal output. 
9. The .\gt!llt and Manager of Ingham Colliery was Mr. E. E. Cleaver. The 
UndN-manager for the No. I Pit was 1\Ir. C. \"alsh:l\\', and for No. 2 Pit, Mr. B. 
,\stOIl. :\fr. Cleaver was abo agent for Combs Colliery, which had a separate 
manager but no under-manager. There were no o\'Crmen at either colliery, the 
deputies coming directly undt�r thl' under-manager. 1\1r. Cleaver came under 
the direction of the Area General Manager, Mr. J. Scoular who, in turn, came 
under Mr. H. M. Hudspeth, the Deputy Production Director and Mr. J. Hunter, 
Production Director for the North Eastem Division of the National Coal Board . 
• 
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10. Tt is perhaps proper to recall that there is a history of firedamp in this 
area for, in the year 1893, an explosion of firedamp occurred at the bottom of 
the Combs downcast shaft, by which 139 persons lost their lives. The shaft was 
then sunk only to the Blocking Bed Coal at a depth of 165 yard<;; but the seam 
being worked at the time was the \\'heatley Lime, which wa<; entered from an 
inset 3..1, yards higher up the shaft across which a wooden staging had been fixed, 
leaving a four-foot space at one side for the passage of air down to the Blocking 
Bed seam. Safety lamps wefe used throughout, except in the immediate 
vicinity of thE' shaft where six open paraffin lamps were used to illuminate the 
shaft inset. A joint report 011 this disaster was made by the late Mr. F. N. 
WardeIJ, 1-1.1\1. District inspector and the late Sir Henry Hall, who concluded 
that firedamp accumulated below the staging and communicated with a feeder 
of firedamp behind the brick shaft walling. The gas was ignited by one of the 
open paraffin lamps. The explosion was miJd and not extenc;i\'e. The heavy 
death roll resulted from suffocation by:.mokc from the wooden fittings in the 
shaft and the wooden staging at the \Vheatley Lime seam inset. which had been 
..,et on fire' by the explosion. The shaft passed through a fault and an attempt 
had previously been made to pipe the gas made there to light the inset. Ga':> 
had, however, been ignited at this point some months before the explosion. 
11. The area of coal in the \Vheatley Lime Seam in which the present 
explosion occurred was opened out some years ago from two stone drifts driven 
from the Beeston Seam, through a 40 yards downthrow fault. One drift wa:. 
driven at an inclination of I in 7 in line with, and as a continuation of, the 
Evison Bord in the Beeston Seam, and this roadway was used as a return 
airway, traveUing and haulage road to the workings in the Wheatley Lime 
Seam. The other drift, which was used as the intake airway, was dri\'en at 
an inclination of 1 in 2. The extent of the workings in this area from that 
time until the explosion is shown in Plan No. 2. 
12. The seam is 2 ft. 1 1  ins. thick and the immediate roof is a strong bind 
with well-defined bedding planes. The floor is a hard fireclay. The only 
district working at the time was the No. 2 South. The method of working 
was advancing longwall with gates at each extremity of the face, which served 
as the intake and return airways. Three dummy gates were also driven to 
provide material to pack the waste. The face a t the time of the explosion 
was 1 .. 1.0 yards in length. The coal was undercut by 10ngwall coal cutters to 
a depth of 4 ft. 6 ins. and was loaded on to a face conveyor which discharged 
to a conveyor in the return gate known as South 2 Conveyor Gate. Belt 
conveyors in tandem in this gate delivered the coal to a conveyor on the main 
haulage road which discharged the coal into tubs at a loading point near the 
top of the 1 in 7 drift. From this point the coal was hauled to the No. 2 tlpcast 
shaft in tubs of 4t and 6+ cwt. capacity by an endless�rol)(' haulage running 
at I t  miles per hour. The first 1500 yards of this haulage road was the E\'ison 
Bord, including the I in 7 drift. Then, 500 yards from the shaft the haulage 
passed round a right-angle bend into the South Ending, where it received 
coal coming from the South Districts in the Beeston Seam. Thl1� the haulag<, 
and conveyor roads were all in the return airway, which was also the travelling 
road into the No. 2 South District. The deputies' meeting station (see Plan 
No. 2) was near the top of the J in 7 drift and was also in the return airway. 
Throughout the district. the conditions generally were slightly damp and 
water collected at certain parts and had to be pumped outbye. Electricity 
was IIsed for operating coal-cutters, conveyors. pumps, drills for coal and 
stone, signalling system and for the telephone circuit, which extended almost 
to the working face. 
13. As previously indicated, the intake air to the No. 2 South District came 
from the Combs �haft by way of a roadway in the Brcston Seam. This roadway, 
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although small in parts was, nevertheless, well regulated. The intake air 
then passed up the I in 2 drift parallel to the I in 7 return drift through the 
40�yard fault and thus entered the Wbeatley Lime Seam. A statutory air 
measurement taken at the top of the intake drift on 26th August, 1947, a 
fortnight before the explosion, showed 15,500 cubic feet of air per minute 
to be entering the district. Other air measurements, however, showed that 
of this quantity only 5,950 cubic feet reached the face of ).:fa. � South, so that 
leakages-which occurred mainly at three points-were very heavy and " ... ill be 
referred to later in more detail. 
14. On the 5th June, 1 947, the No. 2 South Face was 1 85 yards in length. 
At that time the right hand side of the face extended 30 yards beyond the 
No. 2 South Conveyor Gate to a fault (which was being stripped at that time). 
The left side of the face extended for a shorter distance beyond the intake 
airway tail gate. In  this 30 yards of face between the No. 2 South Conveyor 
Gate and the fault, a subsidiary tail gate was packed 9 yards from the fault 
sick·. On the 5th June, 1947, when the third and last of a series of ripping 
shots was being fired in this subsidiary tail gate. firedamp was ignited in a 
break which crossed the shot· hole and the flame passed 6.t yards back along 
the side of the fault. I n consequence, the face was shortened in order to 
concentrate and improve the ventilation, and a 9·inch brick wall, with a two· 
yard dirt pack on the outside of it, was built in the crossgate to seal off the 
subsidiary tail gate. The ignition of gas was investigated at the time by H.M. 
Inspectors of Mines and Officers of the Safety in Mines Research and Testing 
Branch. Followi.ng the present explosion, which blew the 9·inch brick stopping 
and the two·yard pack inwards towards the fault, the locality was again 
inspected by the same investigators to see if the previou� ignition of gas had 
any bearing on the present explosion, but it  was considered that there was 
no connection between the two events. 
IlL-THE EXPLO [ON AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO IT 
15. The explosion occurred in the No. 2 South District of the Wheatlcy Lime 
Seam on Tuesday, 9th September, 194-7, at 11.15 p.m. during the first hour 
of the night shift. The number of persons normally employed during the 
24 hours in this district was 105 but, owing to a wages dispute, the No. 2 
South Face had not been filled off since the previous Friday and, in consequence, 
the normal sequence of work was interrupted. 
16. On the day shift of the 9th September, men other than the usual 
coUiers were employed filling coal off the face and boring shot·holes in the 
coal as the filling proceeded. At the end of the �hift, however, there were 
30 to -10 yardS of face still to fill off. Other workmen were employed in enlarging 
the intake airway near to, and on the outbye side of, the Gledhill Crossgate 
(sce Plan No. 2), and one man wa� attending the pump in the intake tail gate. 
Apart from a broken belt, which was repaired, in the outbye conveyor in the 
South 2 Conveyor Gate, the shift wa'i ulle\"lmtful. 
17. On the afternoon shift, five men were at work erecting bars at the face 
of the South 2 Conveyor Gate and one man was again attending the pump. 
Seven others were engaged enlarging the intake at a point near Old North 2 
District. The deputy on this shift said he made tests with his flame safety 
lamp for firedamp at numerous points in the district but found none. He 
ascended the shaft at 10.30 p.m. with the five men who had been working in 
the South 2 Conveyor Gate, leaving the district, SO far as he knew, in 
perfectly normal condition and certainly not anticipating danger of any kind, 
let alone the disaster which was to follow so soon afterwards. The remainder 
of the men on tlll! shift had left the mine about an hour before the deputy. 
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18. The night-shift for the South 2 Di�trict consisted of 13 persons, 12 of 
whom perished in the explo::.ion. The one survivor, Jesse Clarke, a shot-firer, 
was discharged from hospital on 5th November, 1947, apparently fit and 
unharmed, apart from the scars of burns, but unfortunately suffering from a 
loss of memory and quite unable to remember anything of the events of the 
tragic night. Had he been able to recall what happened, he would have been 
a most valuable witness and would undoubtedly have shed light on many 
points which arose at the Inquiry when various witnesses were endeavouring 
to explain the course of events that night. 
19. The night-shift deputy, F. W. Pearson, two shot-firers, Bemard Hewitt 
and Jesse Clarke, and two bt'ltmen, Arthur \Vilson and Clifford Howarth, 
descended the mine at IQ p.m. This was half·an·hour before the normal 
time for the descent of the night·shift proper. At 10.5 p.m .. before proceeding 
inbye, Pearson consulted with his opposite number 011 the afternoon shift. 
About lO.15 p.m. workmen on the afternoon shift, while on their way outbye 
from the No. 2 Soutb District, met Pearson and his men at the outbye cnd of 
the Evison Bord on their way inbye to work. The beltmcl1, Wilson and 
Howarth, had been instructed to run the conveyor belts and, after the explosion, 
their bodies were found in the position they would have occupied had they been 
performing this task. The switch in the s\\;tch·box controlling the conveyor 
motor was found in the" on " position but a pilot switch alongside one of the 
dead men was in the" off" position. It is possible that the men may have 
had time to open the pilot switch. On the other hand, the conveyor may not 
have been started up. \\'hat exactly happened will never be known, but, in 
my opinion, the question is not material. 
20. The dead bodies of deputy Pearson and shot-firer Hewitt, and the 
unconscious Clarke, were found after the explosion at the deputies' meeting 
station near the top of the retum drift. The time required to walk from 
the shaft bottom to the meeting station was 25 to 30 minutes so that these 
three officials may have arrived there about lO.30 or 10.35 p.m. Their move­
ments after arrival are a matter of deduction and to some extent of surmise. 
It is unfortunate that this is so, since these movements are vital to the correct 
explanation of what happened on the night of this explosion. It is known, 
however, that deputy Pearson telephoned from the meeting station to the 
night onsetter, Herbert CoUomosse, in the shaft bottom at a time which 
CoUomosse put at 10.50 p.m. It was an inquiry as to the number of persons 
on the regular night-shift, which descended the shaft at 10,30 p.m., and who 
were coming to work in the No. 2 South District in the \VheatJey Lime Seam. 
The conversation, however, extended to general topics and did not conclude 
until 11.5 p.m. CoUomosse said Pearson sounded very cheery and certainly 
not like a man who had any thought of impending danger. Immediately 
after his talk with Pearson, Collomosse received a telephone call from a deputy 
in another district who also inquired about the nUlnber of night-shift men 
likely to proceed to his district. This conversation finished about 11.10 p.m. 
21. \\That followed soon after that is best described in the words CoUomosse 
used at the Inquiry. "\Vell, at 11.15 p.m., there was a thud. That was the time 
it happened as far as I can say. I went out of the office and looked round the 
pit bottom, and I could see there was something unusual had happened. There 
were clouds of smoke and things coming into the pit bottom which should not 
have been." After unsuccessfully trying to get into communication with the 
inbye districts, he then telephoned to the surface to raise the alarm. 
22. Four night-shift byeworkers were travelling the South Ending when the 
explosion occurred. They had reached a point about 350 yards from the upcast 
shaft, where two doors led into an intake airway along which they customarily 
(8-1516) 
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travelled to their work in the Beeston Seam. One of these byeworkers in giving 
evidence at the Inquiry said he saw" a terrible flash" and heard a report, 
and he wa') thrown a di"tance of 5 or 6 yards. He described how the air became 
so thick with smoke and dust that he could not see his hand before him as he 
stood upright. 1t was very hot but it was clearer and cooler near the floor. 
,\fier (hat, he and his mates pulled themselves together and assisted each other 
through the doors into the intake where the air seemed to be stagnant but 
quite clear. They then travelled outbye along the intake and through the 
separation doors to Xo. :2 Shaft. A deputy, who was at \\"est Bard 3 in the 
Beeston Seam intake -'SO yards inbye from the junction of the Evison Bard 
with the South Ending, said that at the time of the explosion he noticed a 
"swell of dust" which blew open separation doors between the intake and return. 
This deputy al..,o stated that he parted from deputy Pear!)on and his two shot­
firers at the junction of the Evison Bord at 10.15 p.m., as they proceeded on 
their re�pective ways. thus establishing the time when Pearson and his mates 
left the junction of the Evison Bord with the South Ending. 
23. The night-shift proper for Ko. 2: South District in the Wheatley Lime 
Seam descended the shaft about 10.30 p.m. and consisted of eight per50n.,. 
ThC'y were still on their way inbye and were travelling up the 1 in 7 Drift. but 
had not reached the meeting station, when the explosion occurred. They met 
its full violence and were all instantly killed by it. This brought the toll of the 
explosion to twelve killed and one injured. 
IV.-EXPLORxno�, RESCUE AXD RECOVERY OPER.HIOXS 
2-1. Mr. B. A:-:.ton, Under-:\Ianager of �o. 2: Pit, arrived a t  the colliery about 
11.�5 p.m. on the 111ght of the explosion and was told by the Manager that 
!)ITIoke \,,,'as coming from the fan drift. He descended the Xo. 1 downcast shaft 
and saw a number of workmen, from districts other than the No. 2 South in 
the \\"heatley Lime Seam, congregated in the office near the bottom of the upeast 
shaft. He withdrew them into the intake, which he then proceeded to explore 
with a �mall party of deputies and workmen. On arriving at the separation 
door:-:. about 350 yards inbye from the pit bottom, they found both doors 
damaged, the onc nearest to the return airway being the most seriously damaged. 
They temporarily repaired one of the doors and then proceeded along the intake 
to the separation doors Ilear the outbye end of the E\'ison Bord. They found 
these doors completely blown out and considerable smoke and fumes issuing 
from the E\'ison Bord. Healising that the explosion had occurred in the No. 2 
South District of the Wheatley Lime Seam, the Under-Manager saw at once that 
exploration of the district at that time by way of the Evison Bord was 
impossible. He returned to the shaft and ascended to report the position to the 
Manager, leaving instructions with the deputies to erect brattice sheets in the 
connection between the intake and return at the out bye end of the Evison 
Bord. 
25. After consultation, it was decided to explore by way of the intake air­
way to the district from the Combs shaft, and at 1. .. 10 a.m. on the 10th 
September, ?IlT. Aston, accompanied by 1\Ir. I .  Keeton, Assistant Superintendent 
of the \\'akefield Rescue Station and a Rescue Brigade, descended Combs 
shaft and reached the stricken district by way of the intake airway. Although 
apparently undamaged by the explosion, this intake airway was not a good 
travelling way because of low height, rough floor, and the steepness of the 1 in 2 
intake drift. On reaching the slit between the intake and return j ust beyond 
the intake drift, they found the two separation doors and their frames com­
pletely blown out in a direction away from the return airway, In travelling 
through the slit they thought they heard a moan and on going forward they 
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found Jesse Clarke, the shot-firer, in the return haulage and travelling roau 
with his head resting on the full-side rope (the side remote from the intake) 
which was elevated a little from the floor. It was then about 2.10 a.m., or about 
three hours after the explosion. The reason for Clarke's survival has probably 
an important bearing on the cause of the explosion and will be more fully 
discussed later in this Heport. The Rescue Brigade coupled up and brought 
C1arke out into the intake, where he received first-aid and was kept warm. 
rhey went back again and in the slit beyond the haulage road at the meeting 
station from which deputy Pearson had conducted his last telephone con­
versation, and within a few yards of the position where Clarke was found, 
they reco\'ered the bodies of Pearson and the shot-firer, Hewitt, Mr, Keeton 
then returned to the surface for first-aid material, blankets, brattice cloth and 
to summon further assistance, including another Rescue Brigade, as there 
was no means of telephonic communication available. He returned to the fresh 
air base at the top of the intake drift about 3 p.m. To restore the normal 
ventilation circuit, brattice sheets were then erected in the slit already mentioned 
between intake and return and in the next slit further inbye, where the stoppings 
had been blown out. The party then explored further inbye along the intake 
to the inpye end of. the Evison Bord and then back along the Bord to the 
junction of South 2 Conveyor Gate, where they found the dead bodies of the 
beltmeD, \\'ilson and Howarth. They found the doors and brattice sheet"i 
erected in the continuation of the Evison Bord beyond the junction with the 
South 2 Conveyor Gate had also been blown out and in an inbye direction. 
:-'Ieantime, the sole survivor, Clarke, had been wrapped up and tran ... ported 
to the surface and thence to the hospital. 
26. In  continuance of the work of restoring the normal ventilation, a start 
was made to erect sheets in the Evison Bord beyond the j unction with South 2 
Conveyor Gate. \Vhile this was in progress Mr. Keeton went outbye to obtain 
!:lUll more assistance. At the second inbye slit, he met a party consisting of :'I1r. 
H. J.  Humphrys, I·UJ. Divisional Inspector of Mines, Mr. !. G. E. Leek, H.)!. 
District Inspector and Rescue Apparatus Testing Officer, !\Ir. H. M. Hudspeth. 
Deputy Production Director, and Dr. H. L. \\'iUett, Head of the Safety and 
Research Department of the North Eastern Division of the National Coal 
Board. This party had descended the Combs shaft at 6.15 a.m. and had reached 
the district by way of the intake airway. On passing through the second slit to 
the Evison Bord they detected a trace of firedamp, rising to about 3 per cent. at 
the entrance to the old road opposite and on the far side of the Evison Bord. 
They also detected about 3 per cent. firedamp at the outbye end of South 2 
Conveyor Gate. They returned to the intake, and at a point on this roadway 
about 30 yards inbyc of South 3 they encountered a fall which blocked their 
way, although a small quantity of air was passing through. It wa<; then about 
7.30 a.m. The Under.manager was left at this fall with instruction to get a 
travelling road made through it and the party returned to the outbye end of 
South 2 Conveyor Gate, where the firedamp content gradually diminished to 
I per cent. as the quantity of air passing increased. About this time Mr. J.  
Hunter, Production Director, Mr. \V. E. lanes, Secretary of the Yorkshire Area 
of the National Union of Mineworkers, and Mc Cleaver, the Colliery Agent and 
Manager, arrived. After consultation, an exploration of South 2 Conveyor Gate 
was undertaken by a party, some of whom were not wearing rescue apparatus 
although, as it turned out--despite the fact that the canary carried by Dr. 
Willett was not affected-the percentage of carbon monoxide in the air proved 
to be harmful, for several members of the party suffered slightly from carbon 
monoxide poisoning and the party was forced to retire. Their exertion, and hence 
their breathing, must have been heavy, due to the roadway being badly 
obstructed by falls several feet in height. 
(84516) 
to 
27. In the meantime, another party, under the charge of Mr. J. G. Bond, 
Deputy Area General Manager, and accompanied by Mr. M. McCarthy. H.M. 
A i�tant In!:lpector of Mines, and two rc.:'.Cue brigades under the charge of 
l\'Ir. C. C. Rile)'. Superintendent of the BrierJey Rescue Station, commenced an 
exploration of the £vison Bord from the outbye cnd. They de�cended the 
No. I downcast shaft at lngham Colliery at 9.45 a.m. on the 10th September, 
and tra"clled inbye by way of the intake airway until they reached the recently 
erecled !:!heel!:! which replaced the �paration doors d�lroyed by the explosion 
at the outbye end of the E\'ison Bard. On passing through the sheets into the 
Evison Bord, they were unable to detect firedamp, and the canary carried by 
the party was not affected. On travelling up the Evison Bord they found the 
dead bodies of five men near the bottom of the 1 in 7 drift which was heavily 
fallen. They were unable to find the bodies of the other three victims, which 
were recovered later in the day farther up the drift under heavy falls which 
almost blocked the entire roadway near the top of the drift. Hescue Station 
Superintendent Riley, after working in the drift for three hours without rescue 
apparatus, felt giddy and had heart paJpitation, although the canary beside him 
showed no signs of being affected. 
28. \\'ith the restoration of the ventilation and travell�ng conditions in the 
affected area, careful examination was made of the district by experts on behalf 
of the �l1ll1!:!try of Fuel and Power, the National Coal Board and the National 
nion of Mineworkers. Careful notes were made of conditions as found 
following the explosion and are ::.hown In some detail on Plan No. I. 
1. personally, made an underground in!:!pectton of the scene of the disaster, 
accompanied by representatives of H.M. Inspectorate, the �ational Coal Board 
and the National Union of :\lineworkers. 
29. Dr. F. V. Tideswell of the Safety in :\1ines Research and Tc!:!ting Branch 
of the MlIlistry of Fuel and Power made a particularly careful survey of the area 
affected by the explo:.ion and examined a large nwnber of speci.mens collected 
by him�1f and others for indication!:! of burning. \\'here appropriate, the 
specimens \\ ere also subjected to chemical analysis or other examinations. As a 
result, positive signs of burning were ob�rved at a point on Evison Bord 
haulage road, 200 yards from the outbye cnd, and thence inbye along the road 
to its junction with South 3 disused conveyor road, a distance of about 1,500 
yards; on South 2 Conveyor Gate to the face, a di<;tance of 600 yards; on 
South 210ngwall face, 120 yards; along the Idt intake tail gate, 350 yards; on 
GledhiU Crossgate, 140 yards; along the intake between Gledhill Crossgate and 
Evison Bord; and along the intake airway outbye the £\;son Bord to a point 
about 100 yards short of the right-hand gate of North 1 District. He also found 
signs of burning in parts of the di::.used districts between South 2 Com'cyor Gate 
and Ed<;on Bord. He considered that thc!:!e signs of burning indicated that the 
flame of the explosion traversed a distance of over 3,000 yards. In his \'iew 
the explosion developed moderate violence on outh 2 Conveyor Gate where 
there were heayy falls of ground and damage to the conveyors, and on the 
Evison Bord where there were heavy falb on the 1 in 7 Drift, and tubs were 
badly damaged. Elsewhere the explosion was mild in character and the damage 
was not great. 
V.-CAUSE OF THE EXPLOS!O:-I 
30. All the expert witnesses to the lnquiry were of the opinion, and I agree, 
that the explosion started as a substantial explosion of firedamp. Two 
questions arise. What was the sou�ce of ign�tion? How did t�ere come to be 
an accumulation of firedamp? I w1l1deal WIth these two questions separately. 
I 
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(a) SOllrce of igllition 
31. During the course of the Inquiry only one possible source of ignition was 
put forward. It was the Prestwich type 6 flame safety lamp No. 9. fitted with 
an internal relighter and locked with a lead rivet. This lamp was issued to 
Bernard Hewitt, the shot-firer, before he descended the shaft at 10 p.m. on the 
night of the explosion. After the explosion, the lamp was found in two parts. 
The oil vessel, an opened pocket knife, and two portions of a lead rivet were 
found close to the telephone at the meeting station where Hewitt's body was 
found. The top of the lamp was found 011 the haulage road close to where the 
body of Deputy Pearson was found. Both parts of the lamp, the two parts of 
the lead rivet and the open knife were within 5 or 6 yards of Hewitt's body. 
32. The lamp, lead rivet and knife, as found, were submitted to Mr. C. B. 
Platt, Superintending Testing Officer for the Ministry of Fuel and Power, and 
he submitted a report to the Inquiry with the following conclusions :-
(J) There is as/actual evide1lce:-
(a) The lamp was received in two parts and unlocked. 
(b) The lamp frame passed flame when the reJighter was operated in air 
containing firedamp. (Note: Under cross-examination the witness 
said no adjustment was made to the relighter before the test.) 
(c) Owing to the design of the lamp, the spirit vessel could not be remo\'ed 
from the lamp without extinguishing the lamp flame in the process. 
(d) The screw threads between the lamp frame and the spirit vessel were in 
good condition and free from damage by force. 
(e) The spirit vessel could not be replaced on the lamp frame in the con­
dition of receipt, as the wick tube was bent. 
(f) The wick tube could not have been bent whilst the spirit vessel was 
assembled on the lamp. 
(g) The dust in and which completely filled the grooves of the screw threads 
of the spirit vessel contained traces of coked particles of coal dust; 
this dust could not have accumulated in the screw threads to the extent 
'observed if the vessel had been assembled on the frame prior to and 
during the explosion. 
(2) As circumstantial evidellce, there is :-
(h) The presence of an open jack-knife which was stated to have been 
found near the lamp. 
(i) The remains of a lead rivet also stated to have been found in the vicinity 
of the lamp. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the e\'idence are that :-
(i) The spirit vessel must, of necessity, have been removed from the lamp 
frame prior to the explosion and that it was removed by unscrewing it 
and not by force. 
(ii) The lamp would have ignited firedamp if the rclighter were oper3.teci 
in an inflammable atmosphere whilst the spirit vessel wa'> remO\'ed 
from the lamp frame for, in a test, the spark of the re1ighter ignited the 
firedamp and flame passed through the wick tube sleeve into the outer 
atmosphere. 
(iii) The fact that an open jack-knife and the remains of a lead rivet were 
found near the lamp is significant but the tests to establish that the 
knife had been used to cut the rivet were inconc1usi\'c, nor could it be 
established that the lead rivet was, in fact, the rivet with which the 
lamp was presumably locked when it was issued for use. 
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33. All the other lamps, flame and electric, in use III the district were carefull\" 
examined. Two only were damaged but as ther were found in places where 
it was considered the damage was the result of the C"xplosion, they were not 
considered to be possible sources of ignition�. 
3-1, The electric plant came under su�picion In the early �tages of the 
examination of the district since it was known that current was on the cables 
when the explosIon occurred and at lea:,t onc switch-box wa:.. damaged. The 
telephone system extended almost to the face along the South 2 Conveyor 
Gale and the possibility that it might ha\'c been in use when the explosion 
occurred was considered, although the inner length of the telephone system 
was conlroUed by a switch which was prObably open at the time. 
3;;. Mr. R. L. Parker, H.M. Assistant Electrical Inspector of Mines, said 
in e\'idcnce that, in conjunction with officials of the National Coal Board, 
he had spent 26 days in the inspection and testing of the electrical apparatus 
in the nrea tra\'ersed by the explosion. There were 130 items of electrical 
equipment in u�(' in the district, all of which had been examined underground 
and mo!'.t of which were later brought to the surface for further special and 
exhaustive test. Further, the telephones and signalling apparatus from the 
district were te!:ltcd and reported upon by the appropriate officers of the 
�linistry's Safety in )Iincs Research and Testing Branch. The conclusion 
reached was that the electrical equipment ,  including t('lcphone� and signalling 
apparatus, was very well installed and maintained and that it had played no 
part whate\'er in originating the explosion. 
36. Other po ...... ible sources of ignition were exammed, and, in particular, 
reports were made by specialist officers of the Mmi.':.try's Safety in Mine .... 
Research and Testing Branch on the pos.':.ibilities of ignition by (i) the flame 
of the June ignition which might possibly have continued to burn feebly at 
a feeder coming into a roof break or ca\'ity and (ii) the friction of falling rock 
at the coal face or elsewhere. As the opinions expres ... ed in the- reports were 
negativC', no evidence was called in respect of them. 
37. Having carefully considered the e\'idcnce, and being satisfied that all 
other sources of ignition could be eliminated, I have no hestitation in finding 
that the source of ignition was the operation of the relighting device of flame 
safety lamp No. 9, after the lamp had been taken apart, probably bccaus(' 
the relighter was not working properly and needed adjustment. To open a 
safety bmp anywhere underground at this colliery, and ('�pcciallr in the 
return airway, was a grave misdemeanour and a serious contravention of 
Section �l4 ( 1 )  (iii) of the Coal Mines Act, 1 9 1 1 ,  as amended by S. R. and O. 192 7, 
:\0. l i S;;. There is, however, no evidence to show who opened the lamp or 
who then operated the relighter. 
(b) ACCltllllllalioll of Firedamp 
3..�. There were among the \\'itne�es l\\-'O conflicting school ... of thought as 
to how there came to be in the workings an accumulation of firedamp at 
cxplo.':.ivc point. The evidence is wholly circumstantial, but before I examine 
t hi-. in detail it is important that it should be realised that any explanation 
to be true mm.t be cOIl ... i ... tent with the foHowing facts -
(i) The accumulation of g<b was large. 
(ii) It was brought about quickly, certainly in less than'an hour, and most 
likely in about half an hour. 
(iii) It was present at explo:-.i\'{· point in the general body of the air current 
of the order of 15,000 cubic feet per minute, pas�ing the meeting station 




39. There was no suggestion at all that the seam was liable to QutbUf:,ts of 
firedamp and no evidence of any such disturbance of the strata, c.g. in the 
wastes. as might have forced any large body of firedamp suddenly into the air 
current. The only considerable body of firedamp known to exist in the whale 
of the area concerned was a large accumulation in the Old North I District (Set 
Plan No. 2), which finished in December, 19-&5. The one school of thought 
associated the explosion with this accumulation of firedamp : the other school 
with firedamp not known before the explosion but suspected afterwards to have 
bled off very freely from the fault which formed the boundary of the South 2 
District on the right-hand side up to the time of the ignition of firedamp which 
occurred there in June, 19-1-7. J am in general agreement with the first school 
of thought and shall now exal\line the evidence and give my considered reasons, 
(c) Accumulation of Firedamp in Old North 1 District 
-1-0. This old district was situated alongside the intake airway as it entered 
the \Vheatley Lime Seam and was entered by two roadways branching off 
at right angles from the intake. \Vhen the district was at work, air was caused 
to circulate in it by two doors erected in the main intake airway between the 
two roads. \Vith the doors closed, the air passed up the left-hand road round 
the face and down the right-hand road, after which it ventilated the other 
workings in bye. It was, therefore, what is sometimes called . ,  shunt ventilation " 
-a system which has serious disadvantages. Lt would' have been far more 
satisfactory if an air-crossing had been built and the district separately and 
continuously ventilated. After the Old North I was finished, the door frames 
and settings remained in position in the intake airway, but the doors were lifted 
off their hinges and placed against the side of the airway, onc immediately 
inbye each of the door frames. 
-I- 1 .  After the explosion, the outbye door was found in the position just 
indicated but the inbye door was broken into many pieces scattered along the 
road inbye of the door frame. Photographs of the broken door were produced 
at the Inquiry and also of the door frame and setting. The sill of the door 
frame \\-'as made in three sections. Two of these were found turned O\'('r in 
an inbye direction, obviously by the fracture of the door, for a section of the 
broken door exactly corresponded in width with the two turned over sec�tion� 
of the sill. Moreover, the hanging post of the door frame was broken in half, 
and a piece of the door was found attached to the hook on each half of the door 
post. 
42. Mr. E, S. Rees, H.l\L District Inspector of Mines, expressed the opinion 
that the firedamp which caused the explosion was forced out of old North 1 
District by the closing of the in bye door in the intake airv"'ay between the 
two roads. He considered the door was closed on the night-shift within 30 to 
35 minutes of the occurrence of the explosion. Dr. Tideswell of the Ministry's 
Safety in Mines Research Branch held the same view, except that he considered 
the door was only partly closed. Both considered that the inbye door was 
hanging in the intake airway when the explosion occurred and that it was 
hroken into the condition in which it was found by the blast of the explosion. 
-1-3. A good deal of evidence, much of it contradictory, negative. inconclusive 
and unsatisfactory, was given about these doors. The management admitted 
that for a few months after North 1 District was stopped in 19-1-5, the doors 
were used from time to time to force air round the district whilst plant and 
materials were being withdrawn from it, but they disclaimed any knowledge 
of their subsequent use. Following the removal of the plant and materials. 
they said the doors were lifted off their hinges and were placed against the 
side of the intake airway and that they remained there month after month, 
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apparently not being required for use elsewhere. So far as j" known, the 
la<;t living per::.on'i to tra"el the i ntake airway past the doors, before the 
explosion, was the party of backshift workmen who had been engaged in the 
enlargement of the intake airway near the Old North :2 District. They passed 
the position of the doors about 9 p.m. on their way outbye at the end of their 
shift. Two were called as witnesses. Strangely enough, they both said quite 
positively that they did not see any doors at this point, either standing at 
the side of the airway or hanging on posts . 
. .. I. Evidence of a hearsay nature was given by a deputy who had at one 
time been employed in this district, that one of the doors had been badly damaged 
when a coal-cutting machine, which had been brought out of North I District, 
was being pulled along the airway by means of a sylvester. If the door had 
been damaged in this way it must, of course, have been hanging on the post at 
the time. Evidence was also given by a coal-cutting machineman that the door 
was damaged by a coal cutter when he used the door as a ramp when hauling 
ihe machine over a dint in the floor. J got the impression that this witness was 
confused as to the actlla1 place where this event happened. Tn any case, however, 
as explanations for the damage to the door as found after the explosion, the 
evidence of both witnesses can be completely discarded, for the events described 
were �aid to have occurred many months before the explosion and there was 
reliable evidence that the door, while perhaps not in thoroughly good order, 
was in a fit state to be used shortly before the explosion. Furthermore, I put 
a question to the Under-Manager, Mr. Aston, about the incidents with the coal­
cutting machine. 
Q. Could you conceive that operation could smash the door into the condition 
in which it now is ? 
A .  Well, no. 
-15. Mr. Aston saw the inbye door at 10 .15 a.l11. on the day of the explosion. 
He said the doors were leaning against the left-hand or high side of the airway. 
each a little inbye its particular door frame. The inbye door was then " more or 
less bent in the middle and frayed at the top " but i t  was not damaged to the 
extent as found after the explosion. The day-shift deputy, A. B. Al.lport, said 
the inbye door was only " slightly damaged" when he saw it duling the course of 
his shift on the day of the explosion. The two door frames were undamaged. 
On the other hand, the deputy, C. Barber, on the afternoon shift on the day of 
the ('xplosioo, said the outbye door was on the out bye side of the frame but 
that the inbye door was broken into tb-ree pieces and about one-quarter was 
missing altogether. One piece of this door was on the left-hand side of the 
road and two on the right�hand side, all on the olltbyt side of the door frame. 
H(' went further and said that he had noticed the door in this condition from the 
Thur<;da�· prior to thE' explosion. This evidence was uncorroborated and com­
pletely at \'ariance with that of .\ston and Allport, and I am unable to accept it.  
-16. The doors when hung, opened in an outbye direction and it was generally 
agreed that if either or both were closed or nearly closed, firedamp would be 
forced out of the disused �o. 1 District. Mr. E. E. Cleaver, .\gent and Manager, 
and Dr. H.  L. \Villett, the scientific expert witness for the National Coal Board, 
both accepted the view that if  the inbye door had been closed or partly closed 
at the time of the explosion it would have sustained damage very similar to the 
damagL' it had in fact sustained when seen after the explosion. Moreover, 
Dr. Willett agreed that the damage to the door was not inconsistent with the 
door being hung in position at the time of the explosion. 
47. Thr. question which now falls to be considered is whether firedamp in 
sufficient quantity to account for this explosion could be driven out of the old 
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North 1 District by the closing or nearly closing of the inbye door by someone 
on the night-shift, as was suggested by Mr. Rees and Dr. Tideswell. \Vhilsl he 
could not conceive of Pearson, Clarke or Hewitt closing the door in the pre­
vailing circumstances, Mr. ]. Hunter, Production Director, who led for the 
National Coal Board, put a number of searching questions to several technical 
witnesses to the effect that a very careful scrutiny of the time factor would 
show that, in any event, there seemed to be insufficient time for the night­
shift deputy or any of the other men who had arrived in the district shortly 
before the explosion, to close the door and effect the clearance from the old 
North I District of the necessary quantity of firedamp to account for the 
explosion. As already indicated, the deputy, Pearson, the two shot-firers, 
Clarke and Hewitt, and the two beltmen, Wilson and Howarth, were seen at 
the out bye end of the Evison Bord on their way inbye at a time estimated to 
be 1 0". 1 5  p.m. This point was just short of a mile from the meeting station. A 
very comfortable walking rate underground is twenty-five minutes to the mile. 
There seems no reason why Pearson and his party should not have reached the 
meeting station by 10.40 p.m., which was ten minutes before Pearson commenced 
his telephone conversation with the onsetter, Collomosse, and thirty-fisc 
minutes before the explosion occurred. If, on arrival at the meeting station, 
Pearson wanted to force some air round old North I District by fixing the door, 
which was only a minute's walk from the meeting station. he had plenty of 
time to go round with one of the shot-firers and do so, and be back at the meeting 
station in time for his telephone talk with Collomosse. After the completion of 
the talk, there was time to go back to the door and observe the effect. The 
vital question is whether this, or something like it, actually occurred. This is 
where evidence from Jesse Clark, if he had been able to remember what 
happened that night, would have been of great assistance. 
48. A note from the Under-Manager was found in the pocket of the deceased 
deputy, saying that the Manager intended to visit the district the following 
morning. The Under-Manager said he wrote the note with the object of ensuring 
that the deputy would make " the district look a little bit better." He thought 
the effect on the deputy would be .. to carry the order out and get everything 
straightened up." It was known that there were considerable quantities of 
firedamp in the two roads leading into Old North I District, with more in the 
inbye road than in the outbye Toad, probably because of the regulator 
effect of the door frames. On November 4th, when I made an underground 
inspection at the colliery, the firedamp was in e'xplosive proportions from roof 
to floor at a distance of 57! yards from the "ide of the intake airway in the 
inbye or right-hand road in Old North 1 District, and at a distance of 130 yards 
from the intake in the outbye or left-hand road, the original intake to Old 
North 1 District. On September 22nd, it was necessary to travel up the 
right·hand road for a distance of 200 yards before encountering a similar 
mixture of firedamp. \Vhat was the condition of these roadways i.n Old North I 
District in respect of firedamp on the night of the explosion ? "Vas the right­
hand road full of gas ? If so, the deputy would almost certainly wish to move it 
and the means most readily at hand was to hang one of the doors and close or 
nearly close it. He would know the obligation to keep the roadways clear of 
firedamp on the outbye side of the fences said to be erected near the road ends 
a few yards up from the intake airway, and to keep the intake to the working 
district free from inflammable gas up to a point within 100 yards from the face. 
Moreover, he would know that the returns had to be sampled regularly under 
the new Ventilation Regulations. 
49. Because it seemed to be an action so contrary to what prudence and 
common sense would dictate, the representatives of the National Coal Board 
at the Inquiry suggested that officials with such a good reputation as the 
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deputy and the two shot-firers concemed would be incapable of such reckless 
conduct as to clear out firedamp from old workings, knowing it would foul 
the air current in which the incoming shift were proceeding to work, and then 
allow one of their number to produce a spark in this air current The fact 
remains that one of them did open a flame safety lamp. This action cannot 
be condoned in any circulll<;;tances. 1 am doubtful, however, if any one of 
them was aware of all the circumstances or fully appreciated the possible 
results or consequences of hanging the door. In view of the lack of direct 
evidence, one can only speculate on the probable movements and actions of 
the three men during that fateful half-hour or so before the explosion. And 
there are many possibilities and even probabilities. It  may be that deputy 
Pearson took Clarke with him to hang the door without telling Hewitt. They 
may have spragged the door partly open, expecting that sufficient air would 
pa::.s along the intake to dilute to safe limits the firedamp driven out of the old 
workings, and the- sprag may have subsequently fallen out. Once the door 
was hxed they may both have returned to the meeting station for the telephone 
conversation which the deputv probably expected would last only for a minute 
or b\"O. It lasted instead for some fifteen minutes, after which the two men 
mar ha,"e returned to the door to see the effecl. They probably discovered 
that the fixing of the door had been more effecti,"e in clearing the gas out of 
Old North I District than they had expected. In the meantime, it  may be that 
Ilewitt, finding his lamp extinguished, possibly by firedamp, and being unable to 
rdight i t ,  decided to open it and examine the relighting device. Pearson ma!· 
have returned at this moment ,  leaving (Iarke behind. The relighter was tried, 
by whom no one can say. and the explosion happened. The part of the lamp .. 
containing the relighter was found near to Pearson . but the lamp , .... as issued 
to Hewitt. Both men were killed, but a'i we have seen, Clarke survived. 
J do not think he would have been all\"e had he been in the position where he 
was found at the actual moment of the explosion. I think, therefore, that 
he was in the intake near the door and was about to return to the meeting 
station when the explOSion happened. 
50. The importance of the time factor has been mentioned and 1 ha,·e said 
that there was ample time for the fixing of the door. Consideration must now 
be given to sec if there wa:-. tinle for the firedamp which would be drin:'1l out of 
the Old �'orth I ,  because of the fixing of the door, to reach the meeting station 
in explosive proportion". The last statutory air measurements prior to the 
explosion were made by �lr. Aston, Under-Manager, on the 26th .\ugust, 19-t7. 
The\' showed 1 5,500 cubic feet per minute in the intake at the top of the 1 in 2 
drift and 5,950 cubic feet per minute in the intake at a point 100 yards back 
from the working face. There was, therefore, a leakage of 9,550 cubic feet per 
minute up to, and including, Gledhill's Cro"�gal('. The leakage is exce�i\"C 
in amount but is of special ... ignificance when considering the distribution and 
composition of the firedamp-air mixture concerned in the explosion. I t  will 
be seen from Plan 1\'0. 2 that there were four connections between intake and 
return ; but as there was a brick stopping in the second �lit inbye from the 
top of the 1 in 2 drift, this slit was ruled out as a source of appreciable leakage. 
There were no measurements taken prior to the explosion to determine the 
extent of the individual leakages, but Mr. Aston, in evidence, estimated them 
In cubic feet per minute as 1 ,000 at the fir::.t siit, 3,00  at the end of Evison Bord, 
and 5,000 at Gledhill's Crossgate. On this estimate the fouled air leaking along 
£,"i�on Bard would have to be tharged with 25 to 30 per cent. of firedamp to 
bp faintly explosive when, after dilution at South 2 Junction, it reached th{' 
meeting station, but the air pa��ing down the intake and leaking along Gledhill's 
Crossgate need only contain to per cent. of firedamp to be just above the lower 
limit of inflammability when the combined leakages from Evison Bord and 
Gledhill's Crossgate reached the meeting station. 1\1r. Rees, in e,"idence, 
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estimated that the whole of the district would be fouled with firedamp in about 
half-an-hour from the time the door was closed but because of the leakages 
an explosi\Oe mixture might reach the meeting station in much less time 
depending on the degree of fouling of the intake. The air \vhich leaked along 
the Evison Bard would only take ten or twelve minutes to pass from the intake 
ju�t beyond the door-the fouling point-to the meeting station. Dr. 
Tideswell, who had carefully considered the question of the time required 
for an explosive mixture to reach the meeting station after the closing or 
partial closing of the door, put the limits as 6 minutes and 30 minutes. a time 
range that corresponds wlth the period between the time the deputy first 
arrived at the meeting station and the time of the explosion . 
• 
5 1 .  Dr. \\,ilIett, for the ?"ational Coal Board, resisted the theory that Old 
North 1 District was the source of the firedamp, largely because there was 
no sign of burning or violence observed in the intake on the outbyf' side of tll{' 
old district. He advanced a theory, supported by three diagrams, the intention 
of which-as I understand it-was to prove that the door was not hanging in 
the intake between the two entrances to the old district at the time of the 
explosion and that, consequently, the source of the gas must be looked for 
elsewhere. His theory was based on the observed position of the firedamp in 
the two roads leading into the district on 22nd September and 4th November, 
respectively, indicating a build-up of firedamp of 1 -13 yards in each road in six 
weeks. From these data and certain assumptions, he concluded that if  the 
door had been in position the gas in the Old North 1 District would have 
been rounding the junction of the inbye entrance at the time of the explosion 
and that this gas would have been ignited and would have projected flame 
outbye along the intake, leaving signs of burning. I am wlable to accept 
the validity of this reasoning. }\t best, negative evidence is unreliable when 
considering the passage of flame. r\o signs of burning were observed in the 
outbye slits between the intake and return although it is highly probable that 
flame passed through them. It is not possible to give the precise composition 
of the air in the intake immediately inbye of North I District at the moment the 
explosion occurred. It may not have been explosive. Even if it were, there 
was very little to register signs of burning in the length of intake in question. 
(d) Firedamp from Fault bou,nding South 2 District 
52. Mc. Cleaver, the Agent and Manager of the Colliery, and Dr. \VilleU, 
examined by Mr. Hunter, put forward the theory that the firedamp which 
caused the explosion bled off from the fault forming the boundary of the South 2 
District on the right-hand side up to the time of the ignition in June. They 
said that normally this gas came into the South 2 Conveyor Gate and was 
diluted by the ventilation, but they contended that the faH in the part of the 
intake just inbye of South 3 gate (which had been formed by enlarging a length 
of working face that had been stopped) took place before the explosion and. 
in consequence, the ventilating current was reduced to a point where it was 
unable to dilute the firedamp. Or. \Villett considered that the quantity of 
air passing over the fall when he saw it a few hours after the explosion was 
about 1 ,500 cubic feet per minute, or about 1 4  percent. of the normal estimated 
quantity. At that time the original doors and stoppings in the connections 
between intake and return had been blown out and replaced by temporary 
sheets, so that the quantity would be considerably less in any case than that 
passing prior to the explosion. Dr. \\'illett also suggested that as firedamp wa� 
found bleeding off from roof breaks in the inbye length of intake-a not 
uncommon phenomenon after an explosion-it might have been bleeding off 
before the explosion. On his theory, firedamp from this source would, of 
course, help to account for the presence of flame on this part of the intake and 
acro.:;s the working face, but not on South 3 Gate. 
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53. I am quite unable to accept these VIews. Firedamp had not been 
reported in the district since July 9th. Persons were at work in it until two 
hours before the explosion and did' not detect any and it seems at least unlikely 
from their known actions afterwards that there was any substantial quantity of 
gas in the air current at the meeting station when the three officials first got 
there at about 10.30 p.m. Prior to the explosion the percentage of firedamp 
normaUy present in South 2 Conveyor Gate, as found by analyses, was of the 
order of 0.6 per cent., and the quantity of air passing where the firedamp was 
"aid to have exuded was 5,950 cubic feet per minute. If only 6 per cent. of 
firedamp was present at the meeting station at the time of the explosion-and 
probably there was more-then the air in South 2 Com'eyor Gate must have 
contained about 1 8  per cent. of firedamp, on the basis that about 1 5,500 cubic 
feet per minute nonnaJly passed the meeting station, Moreover, after the 
rxplosion the maximum quantity of firedamp found ,,'as 3 per cent. The 
opinion that the fall in the intake which so reduced the flow of air to the face 
occurred before the explosion was based on what seemed to me to be very 
e;lender and unconvincing evidence. It was just the place where J should have 
expected a fall to occur as a re<:;ult of the explosion, 
54. I have given the fullest consideration to all the evidence and to the views 
of the expert witnesses, and I ha\'e thought long myself about the basic question 
of the source of the firedamp which caused this explosion. It seems to me 
certain that the inner door between the entrances to Old North 1 District was 
fixed in position prior to the explosion and that its destruction was caused by 
the explosion. There was no other acceptable explanation to account for the 
damage. �o onc disputed that i f  the door were hung and closed or partly 
closed, firedamp would be forced out of Old North 1 District and circulate around 
the South 2 District, and r have come to the conclusion that this actually 
occurred, I am unable to account for the indications of the passage of flame 
along the intake ain\'ay in any other way. In my opinion the hanging of the 
door occurred during the night shift but it is not possible to say with certainty 
\\ hich of the fi\'e persons in the district at the time did it . 
.55, At the Coroner's Inquest, which was concluded subsequent to my r nquiry, 
th(> jury found that the firedamp came from Old North 1 District ami that it was 
ignited by a spark from a flame safety lamp opened contrary to regulations. 
They considered that teste; for firedamp should have been made deeper into the 
old district than at the entrances where the fences were erected or, better still, 
that it should haye been pennanently sealed off from the remainder of the 
workings. r shall refer to this question later. 
\'I .-OBSERVATIO)lS ON THE COLiRSE OF THE EXPLOSIOK 
56. As we have seen, evidence of the passage of flame in various places was 
g-iHn by Mr. Rees, Dr. Tideswell, Dr. \Villett and others, Dr, Tideswrll's 
conclusions being aided by hie; examination of e;amples of dust and other 
materials under the microscope. It is clear that flame had been present on 
the South 2 face and in most of the intake and return airways to that face, 
including at least South 3 on the intake and the 1 in 7 Drift on the Evi.:;on Bord 
outbye the meeting station in  the return haulage road. In the intake, flame 
did not travel far. if at all, outbye South 3, In th(, return. outbye the I in  7 
drift in the Evison Bord, coked dust and charred ends of string provided evidence 
that flam.e had actuaJly tr;l\'elled to  within 200 yards of the junction with the 
South Ending. The evidence of Dr. Sutherland that the bodies of the victims 
fonnd in th€' I in 7 Drift were burnt and that death had been immediate or 
almost immediate strongly confinns the presence of flame in the drift. But the 
fact that he did not find bums on the four bodies recovered at the outbye end of 
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the drift may be thought to throw some doubt on the presence of flame there. 
It is possible, however, that these men may have been partly buried by a fall 
caused by the " pioneering wave " of the explosion before flame reached them, 
or that the flame had missed the exposed parts of their bodies in some way as, 
for example, by flame passing above them as they lay flat on the floor. 
. 
57. Taking the source of the ignition as the opened Jamp at the meeting 
station on the Evison Berd-and no onc was able to suggest any other point of 
ignition-I visualise the course of the explosion as follows ;-
(a) First, flame travelled in both directions along the Evison Bard, the 
out bye flame travelling not only with its own natural speed, but being 
forced in addition by the blast of air projected backwards from the flame 
advancing towards the dead-end provided by the several coal faces 
inbye. 
(b) Flame was projected immediately after the ignition a short way down 
both gates of Old South I. 
(,) The doors and stopping in the two slits between the intake and return, 
and opposite the two gates of Old South I ,  were blown when the pressure 
on them became great enough. This was not necessarily while tbe 
flame was still in that vicinity but may have been a second or so later 
during the passage of the flame farther inbye. The door which was hung 
in the intake to divert the air into Old North I was destroyed when the 
blast first entered the intake airway through the outbye slit. 
{d} The flame penetrated into South 3 by blowing the brattice sheets and 
doors in the Evison Bord between South 2 Conveyor Gate and South 3 
face, and into South 2 face along the South 2 Conveyor Gate. In its 
passage along the South 2 Gate, the flame branched into the Gledhill 
Crossgate and travelled along South 2 intake tail gate to South 2 face. 
(e) Part or all of South 2 face was traversed by flame which came from 
either the Conveyor Gate or the intake tail gate or from both. 
(j) Flame from South 3 travelled out bye along the intake and died out 
somewhere near the junctions of the entrances to Old North 2. It did 
not travel further outbye along the intake, either because insufficient 
inflammable gas was by that time coming from old North I ,  or because 
the atmosphere coming from it contained such a high percentage of 
firedamp that, even after dilution with whatever air was mingling \\;th 
it on the main road, there was more than 14 per cent. of firedamp 
present and the air was therefore non-inflammable. 
58. The evidence that can be derived from the " lines of force " of an 
explosion has been valuable on many occasions as an indication of the direction 
of travel of the explosion. Despite the fact that careful records of aU such 
signs had been made in this case by various witnesses to the inquiry, neverthe­
less their significance was ambiguous. Dr. \Villett argued that the " lines of 
force " radiated from the vicinity of the transfer point on South 2 Conveyor 
Gate, and not from the meeting station on the Evison Bord. This led him to 
suspect the former as the starting point of the explosion, but he was unable to 
point to any possible source of ignition there, or indeed, anywhere else than the 
opened lamp at the meeting station. On the other hand Mr. E. S. Rees con­
sidered the evidence of direction of force was consistent with the explosion 
starting at the meeting station. 
VII.-THE INFLUENCE OF COAL DUST 
59. No one disputed that this explosion began as a firedamp explosion, but 
there were some differences of opinion as to the part subsequently played by 
coal dust. There was very little evidence of coking visible to the naked eye. 
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Indeed, the only coking that could be readily discerned in this way was mainl\' 
in South 3 conveyor gate, on the left side of South 2 face, and a patch or two in J. 
few other places. 
60. 1\lr. 1::. S.  Rees thought coal dust played a very minor part in the propaga­
tion of the explosion and considered sufficient firedamp was driven out of old 
North 1 District to account for its extent. Dr. Tideswell found " a ,'ery exteno;;ive 
depo�ition of fine coke du..,t over the whole of the area which I have concluded 
was tr3\'crsed by flame, but it was not obvious to the eye ; it  only became c\'idcnt 
when the du.,t samples taken were examined under the microscope." He went on 
to say that in his ,'iew the explosion was mainly onc of firedamp. although he 
was prepared to belie\'e that it was extended by coal dust along the out bye 
length of the E\'ison Bord, and was assisted locally here and there by coal dust, 
especially in South 2 Conveyor Gate. If it  was entirely a firedamp explosion­
and he saw nothing inconsi"tent with such an assumption-some 1 5,000 cubic 
fcet of pure firedamp would be required to propagate it through the 3,000 yards 
111 which he found indication ... bf flame. Such a quantity, he thought, could be 
present in Old .\forth I District. He was not able to " distinguish between a 
hredamp explosion which raised coal dust in the flame and coked it, and one 
in which there was not enough firedamp to bave burned without coal du::,t 
being there." He thought it likely that coal dust would be picked up from the 
conn\'or belt and perhaps from the roadways and, in that sense, coal du>.;t 
would take part in the propagation ; but that did not mean that the explosion 
would not have been propagated by firedamp alone had there been no coal dust 
present.  He said that generally it was difficult to have a firedamp explosion in a 
colliery in which coal du!'t is not involved. I n  this explosion he considered coal 
du�t did not play a deci<;i\"e part. 
6 1 .  Dr. \rillett, while agreeing that the explo.,ion started as a firedamp 
(''<plo..;,ion, thought coal dU""t played a definite and more lhan a minor part in 
Its propagation, Ha\'ing heard the e\"idence about thl' breaking of the belt in 
South 2 COI1\'eyor Gate on the day-shift, he thought there would be sufficient 
coal dust on the belt and from roadway spillage to be raised into the air as a cloud 
and " that was the way in which the explosion was extended as far as it wa..,." 
He said he could not tell to what extent coal dust played a part but, in answer to 
a question put by me, he said in his opinion coal du�t played a greater part than 
firedamp in the spread of the explosion. This view was no doubt influenced 
by the fact that on his theory of the ::,ource of the firedamp there would be 
ulsufflcient inflammable gas to account for the extent of the explosion unless 
assisted by coal du<;t. 
62 . .. \!though I am of the opinon that the evidence did not warrant the wide 
din>rgence of view between Dr. \ViUett and other witnesses as to the part played 
by coal dust in this explosion, nevertheless, that there should be some variance 
of opinion as to the extent to which coal dust played a part is not strange, 
The fact that patches of coke dust were found in certain places pro\'es no more 
than that the dust agglomerated into these patches had been exposed to heat, 
which might have been the heat of the burning of firedamp or of the burning of 
coal dust, or heat in unknown proportions from both these sources. So far 
as I am aware, the significance of post explosion effects of thi� kind has received 
very little experimental study and, in the present lack of knowledge, a finding 
as to the part, if  any, played by coal dust in extending a firedamp explosion is 
usually not a fact established by direct evidence as much as an inference from 
opinions previously fonned as to the probable extent of the firedamp explosion. 
This is not a happy position and experimental work might well be attempted 
with the object of clarifying it. 
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63. Apart from the experimental difficulties, severe limitations might well 
arise in applying experimental results obtained under a comparati�'ely narrow 
range of conditions to the widely varying. and always to some degree unknown, 
conditions of an actual pit explosion. But, nevertheless, an attempt ought to 
be made and two lines of attack occur to me :-
(a) An estimation of the amount of coking. or " ashing ", of coal dust 
which occurs on explosion in air alone and in a firedamp-air mixtur(' ; 
and the influence of excess or deficiency of oxygen, of the presence 
of incombustible dust and of sudden \'ariations, e.g., hold-ups, in the 
speed of propagation of the explosion ; 
(b) An examination of post explosion samples (such as could be collected 
after an actual pit explosion), \\;th a view, if possible, to discriminating 
in relation to the proportion of unburned coal dU:.>t between the 
residues of coal dust distilled without burning and coal duo;t wholly 
or partly burned. 
6-1. As I have just indicated, it is not possible to say with certainty that 
coal dust contributed to this explosion, or if it did, to say to what extent. 
The dust samples collected on the roads after the explosion contained, on the 
anrage, about 70 percent. of incombustible matter. );' ow it has long been known, 
from large scale experimental explosions made in this and other countries, 
that in the presence of small amounts of firedamp a greater percentage of in­
combustible dust-in direct proportion to the percentage of firedamp in the 
air-is needed to protect the coal du:.>t. In other words, this means that while 
the dust conditions and the firedamp conditions may. separately, be perfectly 
safe. in combination they may be otherwise. In a roadway where there is a 
liability to firedamp, as will nonnally be the case in a return airway in a safety 
lamp mine, an increase in the percentage of stone dust on the floor, roof and 
::;ides, above that required to deal with coal du'>t alone is, therefore, essential. 
If we assume there was 3 per cent. of firedamp in the atmospherE' in any of the 
roadways traversed by the explosion, then it would ha\"e required at lea:.>t 
80 per cent. of incombustible matter in the du"t on that roadway to protect 
the coal dust present and prevent propagation of flame. 
65. In  view of these possibilities, it becomes necessary to review the measures 
taken by the management to discharge their obligations under the General 
Regulations (Precautions against Coal Dust) 1939. 1\[r. Aston, Under-Manager, 
said that three men-one on each shift-were regularly employed cleaning 
up the dust on the conveyor roads. The sy::;tem was to clean up for a length 
of six or eight trays, including the part under the belt, on each shift and then 
stone dust this length. The loading points and transfer points were cleaned up 
every day. A sample was taken from each zone ( 176 yards in length) every 
month. The number 01 samples taken during the three month" ending 31st 
August, 19-17, was 156, of which 5 were slightly adverse. The places where 
these adverse samples were taken were cleaned up, redusted and resampled ru; 
soon as possible. One man was continuoU5ly employed on cleaning up and stone 
dusting the haulage roads in the Beeston and \Vheatley Lime Seams. 
66. In general, it is difficult in practice to maintain the percentage of incom­
bustible matter required by the Regulations on conveyor roads which are intake 
airways_ It becomes more difficult still to maintain safe conditions where the 
conveyor road is a return airway in which inflammable gas is likely to be present. 
In this explosion there is nothing to suggest a major coal dust explosion develop­
ing from a small firedamp explosion. Nevertheless, there is perhaps a little 
doubt and possibly a slight risk in assuming that coal dust played only a very 
minor part and, consequently, this explosion-like the recent explosions at 
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Louisa Colliery, Durham, and \Vhitehaven " William " Pit, Cumberland­
directs attention once again to the need for more research into the deposition of 
coal dust in conveyor roadways and the best means of counteracting it. Whilst 
the conditions in many parts of the Wheatlcy Lime Seam at this Colliery could 
be considered dry and dusty, they were not strikingly so. Several parts of the 
district were damp. Ne\'ertheless, as I said in my recent Report on the explosion 
at the \Vhitehaven " William " Pit , when dealing with the danger from coal 
dust in conveyor roadway::., " 1 �hould Like to press the point very strongly that 
if compliance with the dust regulations at all timC!) in dry and dusty mines is to 
be reasonably assured, and the conditions in such mines are to be improved in 
respect of health and comfort, then all practicable steps must be taken in the 
first instance to prevent or reduce dust formation at ils source and to suppress 
by water infusion, sprays and wet·cutting, wet-drilling or other appropriate 
means, any dust that is inevitably made. "  And in view of the fact that the 
required percentage of incombustible du..,t required to protect the coal dust 
must be increased in amount in direct proportion to the percentage of 
inflammable gas present in the air, it  follows that one of the practical steps that 
should be taken is to a\'oid the use of return airways for the conveyance of 
coal. Unless suitable means can be devi�ed for combating the coal dust danger 
from conveyors, it may be necessary to consider the prohibition of coal 
conveying in allY return airway in a safety lamp mine. 
VIlI .-ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
(a) On the Presence and Removal. oJ the Accumulatio1l of Firedamp 1'n 
Old North 1 District 
67. It was known to the management that the abandoned workings in Old 
North I District contained a substantial body of firedamp. Tt must also have 
been known that when these old workings filled with firedamp, the " make " 
would almost certainly find its way into the intake air current entering the 
working districts of the '''heatley Lime Seam. It does appear, however, that the 
. .  make " was small because, prior to the explosion, there was no history of 
any appreciable fouling of the intake air entering the working district, while 
the results of air analyses showed that the normal firedamp content of the air 
in the return airway from the working faces was about 0 · 6  per cent. Never­
theless, the position with respect to this Old North 1 District was such .that 
i t  is disturbing to find that no positive steps were taken to deal with the fire­
damp made in the old workings : it was bounded by faults and its entrances 
joined the intake airway as the air entered a working district in which. electricity 
was extensively used and shotfiring extensively practised. Either the old district 
should have been stowed, importing material for the purpose, if necessary, or 
the district should have been sealed off by efficient stoppings, or steps should 
have been taken to maintain the circulation of sufficient air round the old 
workings to prevent an accumulation of firedamp and ensure that the firedamp 
swept out was diluted and rendered hamlless. As r said in my recent Report 
on the Explosion at the \Vhitehaven .. \Villiam " CoUiery. Cumberland, " a  
reservoir of inflammable gas anywhere in a mine is always a potential source of 
danger ; but it becomes a lively hazard if it is near, or may react upon, a work­
ing place, or near any possible source of ignition." \\Then it is known that a 
substantial accumulation of inflammable gas exists anywhere in a working 
mine, the matter should receive the careful consideration of the higher manage­
ment, who should decide what is to be done about it and the agreed policy 
should be made clearly known to the under officials in charge in the area and 
efficient steps taken to see that the policy is carried out. 
, 
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68. \\llere a large accumulation is known to exist and steps have to be taken 
to sweep it out, the operation should only be done on a well-considered plan and 
under the close supervision of a superior official. Clearing away a large accumu­
lation of gas is not a simple and easy operation, and unless it is done very care­
fully it  may e...1.sily lead to serious trouble. Clearly. such an operation should not 
be- done during a nonnal working shift and the means for doing it should not be 
so handy that it can be applied by any junior official without the knowledge 
of the higher management. It should certainly not be so easy as i t  was in this 
particular instance, where for a year or more all that was necessary was to place 
a door on its hanging post-an operation that could be perfprmed by anyone 
in a few minutes and without attracting much notice. 
(b) 011 the Use of Lead Rivet Locks on Flame Safety Lamps 
69. As 1 have already stated, the source of ignition in this explosion was 
the operation of the relighting device, which was probably considered by the 
operator not to be funct ioning properly, of a flame safety lamp after the lamp 
had been taken apart by the cutting of the lead rivet by which the lamp wac; 
locked. It may be recalled that an exactly similar action was believed to be tIll? 
source of ignition in the Explosion at the Harrington No. 10 Colliery, Cumber­
land, on the 9th December, 1946 (Report Cmd. 7222). Because of the ease with 
which a flame safety lamp locked by a lead rivet can be opened, the question 
of the prohibition of this type of lock is worthy of careful consideration. There 
is no doubt whatever that a lamp secured by a lead rivet is much easier to open 
than one secured by a magnetic lock, although it is not unknown for even a 
magnetically locked lamp to be opened illegally underground. On the other 
hand, if the lead rivet is properly squeezed by a rivetting device which leaves 
a distinctive mark, and if the lamps are properly examined, as ther should be, 
when they are returned to the lamproom the chance of the offender being 
detected is much greater with the lead rivet than the magnetic lock. But I am 
afraid these safeguards, without which the lead rivet is hardly a lock at all, 
are by no means always taken-and even i f  they were it must not be forgotten 
that there are circumstances in a mine when the temptation to open a flame 
safety lamp is very strong, even at some risk of subsequent detection. When a 
flame lamp has been extinguished or the relighting device is not functioning 
satisfactorily, to have the lamp relit or to secure another lamp may mean in 
certain circumstances travelling a long distance outbye, or a long wait for 
another lamp to be brought from the surface that may seem to the person 
concerned a waste of valuable time, more especially in an emergency when he 
may be in difficulty or danger. Human nature being what it is, the easier it is 
to do a thing one is tempted to do, the more likely is one to succumb to the 
temptation. There is, therefore, some justification for the prohibition of the lead 
rivet lock. In present circumstances, with aU the difficulties of supply, I do not, 
however, feel justified in recommending its prohibition forthwith, but r do 
suggest that the policy in this matter should be to eliminate the lead rivet lock 
and replace it by an efficient magnetic lock, as circumstances permit, and that 
the changeover should be effected in all cases where existing flame safety lamps . 
fitted with a lead rivet type of lock, are due for substantial reconditioning or 
complete replacement. 
(c) On the Need for an Improved Form of Religltting Device 
for Flame Safety Lamps 
70. It is highly probable that in the present explosion and in the recent one at 
Harrington No. 10 Colliery, Cumberland, the primary reason for the opening 
of the flame safety lamp. believed to be the source of ignition in both explosion,>, 
was a defect in the lamp relighting device. The Pyrophor relighting device 
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incorporated i n  a flame safety lamp works on the same principle as the common 
type of cigarette lighter. I t  is by no means wholly reliable. There is undoubtedly 
a need for a more efficient and positi,,"c type of re1ighter. I feel there is scope 
here for the sClcnti..,t and inventor and I commend thit; '>uggr<;tion for their 
attention. 
l X.-SU�I�I.\RY OF CO:\CLUSIOl\S 
71 . Summarising the result, of the Inquiry, I fll1d that :-
( I )  The source of ignition in this explosion was a "park produced by the 
operation of the relighting device of Rame safety lamp Xo. 9 aftN the 
debberatc removal of the �pirit \"essel which had been made possible by the 
cutting of the lead rivet lock ; the lamp was op'ened i n  order to adjust the 
internal T("lighter, which wa<; believed not to be fUllctioning properly ; the 
opening of liw lamp wa� a grave misdemeanour and a contravention of 
Section 34 ( I )  (iii) of the Coal l\lines Act, 1 9 1 1 ; then' were lwo men, a 
deputy and a shotfirer-both subsequently killed by the explosion-at the 
meeting station in the return airway and main haulage road from the \\lleatley 
Lime Seam District when the relighting de\'ice was operated in the opened 
lamp, but ther(' io:; no f'vidence to "how who actually opened the lamp and who 
then operated the relighter, 
(2) The "park from the relight er in the opened lamp ignited an inflammable 
firedamp-air mixture i n  the general body of the air current pasc;ing the 
meeting ..,tation at the tllne, causing a firedamp explo<;ion. 
(3) I he flame of the explosion traycrsed a di .... tance of approximately 3,000 
yardo:;, including nearly all  of the inbye working roach and faces and more than 
1 ,000 yard ... along the main return haulage road outby(, the meeting �tation. 
(-l) Th£' explo ... ion developed moderate violence i n  the South 2 Conveyor 
Gate and in the 1 in 7 Drift i n  the Evison Bord haulage road, but cJ .... ewhere 
the ('xplo<.,ion \\'a" mild in character. 
(S) Thc (''{plosion was mainly one oC firedJmp and it i" not po",-"ible to say 
with c(,rtainty that coal dust contributed to it ,  or if it  did, to what ('x tent. 
(6) The main source of the fIredamp was the abandoned workings in the 
Old �orth 1 Di5trict ; this firedamp was forced out of the Old North 1 
District by the fixing and closing, or nearly closing, of a door i n  the intake 
airwa\' between the two entrances to the old district ; thi<; door had been 
fi'{cd ·on thc night shift about half-an-honr or thf'rrb\' before the explosion 
occurred ; and it io:; not possible to say which of the th'(' per�on'i in the di"trict 
at the tim(' fi'\ed the door. 
X.-REcmmDIDATIO:<� 
72 . .  \'i a rc.'o:;ult of th(' Inquiry, I make the following recommendation<; :­
(a) ParI Played by Coal Dust ill Estimating a Firedamp Explosion 
( 1 )  In virw of the present lack of knowledge as to the part, if any, played by 
coal dust i n  extcnding a firf'rlamp explosion, cxperimrnts should be made to 
darifv the position, and I suggest two lines of attack ;-
(i) An estimation of the amount of coking, or " ashing ",  of coal dust 
which occurs on explosion in air alone and in a fir('damp-air mixture ; 
and th(' inAuence of £'xce$S or deficiency of oxygen, of the presence of 
incombu ... tible dll<;t and of sudden \';"1ri;"1tioJ1<;, ('.g., hold-ups, in the speed of 
propagation of the explosion. 
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(ii) An examination of po�l-cxplo5ion dust samples (such as could be 
collected .\fter an actual pit explosion) with a view, if possible, to 
discriminatmg in relation to the proportion of unburned coal dust between 
the residue� of coal dust dbtillcd wi thout burning and coal dust whoUy or 
partly burned. 
(b) Coal CO/ltlcyillg in i?eluyu Airu.'llys in a Safety Lamp Aline 
(2) Until efficient and suitable means can be found for combating the coal 
dust danger frOm conveyors. the management at all safety lamp mines should 
take step::. to avoid the use of return airway::. for the conveyance of coal. 
(c) Prevention ami Removal DJ Accumulations of Gas 
(3) In mines where firedamp is likely to accumulate in abandoned workings 
sleps should be taken either (i) to stow the abandoned road ways, importing 
material where necessary, or (ii) to maintain sufficient ventilation to prevent 
an accumulation of gas and to dilute and render harmless the gas that is 
removed, or (iii) to seal off the old workings by efficient stoppings, the 
method adopted to be determined by the circumstances in each case. 
(4) \\'hen it is known that a substantial accumulation of inflammable or 
noxious gases exists anywhere in a working mine, the method of dealing with 
it should be considered by the management, who should decide what is to be 
done. The agreed policy should be made known to all officials in the area 
concerned and steps should be taken to scc that it is properly carried out. 
(5) \\'here a large accumulation of gas is known to exist and steps have to be 
taken to clear it, the operation should only be done on a well-considered plan 
under the close supervision of a superior official of the mine and at a time 
when few persons are in the pit. 
(d) Lead Rivet Locks for Flallle Safety Lamps 
(6) Because of the ease with which a flame safety lamp, secured by a lead 
rivet lock, can be opened it should be the policy to eliminate all such locks and 
replace them by efficient magnetic locks, as the circumstances of the supply 
position permit. In the meantime the changeover should be made in all cases 
where existing Rame safety lamps, fitted with the lead rivet lock, are due for 
substantial reconditioning or for complete replacement. 
(e) Improved Form of Relighti11g Device 
(7) In view of the unreliability of the existing type of Pyrophor Rclightcr 
for flame safety lamps, an effort should be made to devise a more positive and 
efficient relighter device. 
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LIST OF \VlT�ESSES 
1. Benjamin Taylor Nowell 
2. Thomas Green . .  
3. l3C'rnard Aston 
4. Peter Lindsay Sutherland 
5. .\lfred Bernard AlIport 
6. Claude Barber . .  
7. Ralph Lawrence Parker 
8. Arthur William Fisher 
9. Erncst Smithson 
10. \Villiam Craw�haw 
1 1 . ,\rthuf Littlewood 
12. John Rodgers . .  
13. I-tarry \VraithmeU 
1-1. John Francis Taylor . .  
1 5 .  Herbert Collomosse . .  
16. Ilarold Edmundson . .  
17. George William Kitson 
18. Clifford Cyril Riley 
19. lsaac I<eaton . .  
. . 
20 . Claudc Bernard Meister Platt 





Edward Sims Rees 
Waiter Clarke . .  . . 
Eric Edward Cleaver . .  
Frederick Vincent Tideswell . . 
Harry Leslie Willett . .  . . 
Surveyor 
H.M. A�istallt Inspector of MUles 
Under Manager 
Pathologist, \Vest Riding County Council 
Deputy 
Deputy 












Superintendent, Brierley Re:.cue Station 
Assistant Superintendent, \Vakefield 
Rescue Station 
Superintending Testing Officer, Ministry 
of Fuel and Power 
H.!l.f. District rnspector of Mines 
Ripper 
Agent and Manager 
Senior Principal Scientific Officer, Minis­
try of Fuel and Power 
Principal, Research and Safety Depart­
ment of North Eastern Division. 














1 1 .  
12. 
Fred \Viltiam Pearson 
Bernard Hewitt . .  
Clifford Howarth 
Arthur \Vilson . . 






John )Iiddleton . . 
Stanley )[iddleton 
J "jured 
I. Jesse Clarke 
(81,516) Wt. 695/3-40 7 48 H. 
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